The looming Colombian elections have raised questions about the future of current national policies. Incumbent President Alvaro Uribe’s showcase strategy “Democratic Security” led to a more successful Plan Colombia, a bi-lateral initiative with the United States to curb drug trafficking and encourage sustainable human development. Though it is often criticized, I believe that Plan Colombia needs no defense. Instead, it needs to be understood and evaluated within a context of what our country has experienced socially and politically in the last half century.
This program was formulated in 1999 by the Colombian government to create the conditions for peace. That has been its main objective: sustainable peace, by guaranteeing that the state can exercise its monopoly of power and that its sovereignty, territory and people are not at risk. Plan Colombia was built on this premise to promote social and economic recovery of vulnerable populations in particular, to strengthen governmental agencies, and to protect human rights. The strategies aimed at dismantling production and processing of drugs and of trafficking organizations, and reduce the violent and corrupting influences of narcotics in our country. But the fight against the consumption and trade of illegal drugs is not Colombia’s problem alone; instead, it is a responsibility we share with the United States – the world’s largest cocaine market, according to the 2009 UNODC World Drug Report. This explains why the United States contributes 35% of Plan Colombia’s budget.
Washington has cooperated with the Colombian government to build a long-term strategy reinforcing its presence throughout its territory. It has enhanced military capacity by promoting modernization, professionalization and high-level training, thus sharply reducing violence from guerrilla and paramilitaries. It has improved local and regional governments’ ability to deliver essential services, and has helped providing the most vulnerable with alternative legal livelihoods that cut their reliance on the production of illegal drugs. Critics say that the U.S. dictates Colombia’s domestic policies, but in the case of Plan Colombia, which was designed by our Department of National Planning, this is especially untrue. Like any self-governing nation, Colombia is more than capable of formulating and implementing policies in the best interest of its citizens.
Our neighbors have also been critical about this help; they worry about the presence of the U.S. and about the stability of our country. But I think it is crucial to say this is an ‘intervention by invitation’. The U.S., like no other government has done yet, has realized that an integrated strategy is required to end this conflict. Every country in Latin America complains about the problems with the Colombian ‘war’ and the awful effects of drug trade, but none takes responsibility for tackling a conflict that also affects them. This is a fight where Colombia has always needed allies not enemies, where recovering trust has been crucial for the state, and where no nation is exempt from the suffering of the problems associated with illegal drugs and criminal organizations’ maneuvers.
Colombia has long suffered an internal conflict, where national armed forces have confronted guerrillas and paramilitaries for the last fifty years, fighting to recover strategic territory. Every new government has campaigned and been elected with a new formula to end a conflict that Colombians no longer tolerate. Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) came to office promoting peace dialogues at the end of the 1990s, when guerrillas had extended their power and had allied with drug ‘cartels’ linking their finances to illegal substances traffic, in addition to their usual kidnappings and burglaries. They had also increased selective murders, massacres and displacement. After three years of peace talks with FARC and ELN, the efforts failed. Guerrillas would not cease-fire and their insurgency actions prevailed.
In 2002, Uribe, a hard line candidate with a discourse based on “Democratic Security” and a straight message to guerrillas to cease fire as a prerequisite to negotiate, was elected as the President. People in our country wanted action and change. In this sense, Plan Colombia (which only started two years prior) became crucial for the strategy of achieving peace by recovering territory from the hands of guerrilla, and by strengthening the operational capacity of our forces. Most importantly, it reinforced legal assistance between Colombia and the U.S., through which more than 1,000 drug kingpins, guerrilla and paramilitaries have been extradited. It also enables Colombia to eradicate 700 hectares (about 1,550 football fields) of illegal crops daily.
Plan Colombia has also created strategies that allow internally displaced people and vulnerable communities to gain access to their citizenship rights, to income generation, housing and land entitlements, education and health. It has also permitted many of them (more than 500,000 during this government period) to return to their places of origin. Thanks to the program there have also been huge successes on alternative development programs, including the Forest-Keeping Families and Families in Action programs, which eradicate cocaine crops, encourage stable employment and income alternatives, and provide education and nutrition subsidies for children.
All these strategies evidence that in a new world order where organised crime and social problems surpass national borders; the fight against drugs needs joint efforts. The success of Plan Colombia is not only of vital importance for Colombians and the U.S., but also for the international community and for the region itself. Latin America has a particular responsibility to fight terrorism and illegal armed movements that could also affect their security and territory, and that could hinder democracy and governability. Commitment by all countries to the principles of balanced action are crucial to end a phenomenon that changes and adapts its strategies to hide and to operate illegally everywhere.
